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Janice Fine1 and Jennifer Gordon2

Abstract
Structures of employment in low-wage industries, a diminished wage and hour
inspectorate, and an unworkable immigration regime have combined to create an
environment where violations of basic workplace laws are everyday occurrences.
This article identifies four “logics” of detection and enforcement, arguing that there
is a mismatch between the enforcement strategies of most federal and state labor
inspectorates and the industries in which noncompliance continues to be a problem.
In response, the authors propose augmenting labor inspectorates by giving public
interest groups like unions and worker centers a formal, ongoing role in enforcement
in low-wage sectors. In three case studies, the authors present evidence of an emergent
system—one that harkens back to a logic proposed by the drafters of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) but never implemented—of empowering those closest to the
action to work in partnership with government.
Keywords
enforcement, immigrant, labor standards, FLSA, community

Millions of low-wage workers, many of color and foreign-born, toil long hours at the
bottom of the American economy, routinely denied their rightful wages. A recent study
found that 26 percent of low-wage workers1 in the nation’s three largest cities suffered
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minimum-wage violations in the week prior to the survey, and more than 76 percent of
low-wage workers who labored more than forty hours in the prior week were not paid
according to overtime laws.2 In some regions, the Department of Labor itself has
recorded Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) noncompliance levels greater than 50 percent in industries such as nursing homes, poultry processing, day care, and restaurants.3 For a developed nation with a functional legal system, long-standing and fairly
comprehensive wage and hour laws at the federal and state levels, and stable inspectorates embedded in well-established civil service systems, the United States has staggeringly low levels of compliance with wage and hour laws.
Labor standards enforcement is not working. Why not, and what should the response
be? We begin by analyzing the impediments to effective enforcement in low-wage
sectors today. We trace a set of “logics,” or theories as to how best to detect violators,
that have dominated wage and hour enforcement over the past century: a logic of
detection through worker complaints; a logic of proactive, targeted inspections; a logic
of comprehensive coverage; and a logic of self-regulation by firms. While the first and
second logics of complaints and strategic inspections remain important, they have
proven insufficient to the problem at hand. Resource constraints have rendered the
logic of comprehensive coverage infeasible. Furthermore, in low-wage sectors that
have proven particularly resistant to enforcement, we note broad agreement that the
fourth logic of self-regulation is rarely appropriate.
We then move on to the core argument of the article: that the time has come for the
revival of a different approach in low-wage industries, one proposed at the time of the
New Deal but defeated before the final version of FLSA even began its journey through
Congress. This alternative logic called for workers’ organizations as well as firms to
partner with the government to detect violators, relying on the incentives of unions and
high-wage enterprises to patrol their industries and labor markets for unfair competition. We draw on this idea in laying out a vision for a new enforcement regime to
supplement complaint-driven and targeted inspections at both state and federal levels.
Although our proposal has several elements, the most fundamental change it would
introduce is tripartism:4 a strategy of enforcement that involves giving workers’ organizations equal standing with government and employers. In three state and local
cases, we find evidence of this approach in an emergent system that harkens back to
the original idea of those with the greatest incentive and closest to the action working
in partnership with government.5
After setting out those cases and analyzing the lessons they offer, we conclude by
addressing some objections to the approach, reflecting on what we learned from the
case studies. What we propose is unlikely to be adopted wholesale at the federal level
any time soon, and yet these experiments in state and local contexts demonstrate the
present feasibility of aspects of what we propose and highlight its potential to extend
the reach of the state in a context of fiscal crises at every level of government.
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I. Why Is Enforcement Not Working in the
Low-Wage Sector?
Obstacles to Enforcement
Decreasing funding with an expanding mandate. Although our interest is in wage
enforcement at both state and federal levels, we focus in this section on FLSA because
of its central importance and because many state wage laws are now patterned on the
federal regime.6 When FLSA was enacted in 1938, it only covered about a third of
American workers. Among those excluded were agricultural, domestic, service, and
retail workers. In the decades following its passage, coverage gradually expanded,
through incorporation of occupations and industries previously excluded from the act.
Many small businesses were included when Congress lowered the threshold volume
of annual sales that determined whether a firm had to obey FLSA.7 The range of industries now covered by FLSA is much wider than the manufacturing sector for which the
law was originally intended. It is not clear to us that the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s)
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has ever had a theory about how to effectively patrol
such vastly different industries.
Meanwhile, although funding for inspections initially increased following the
extensions of coverage, it was not sustained. The past thirty years have seen a 55 percent increase in the estimated number of workers and a 112 percent increase in the
number of establishments covered under FLSA.8 Although the number of WHD
inspectors doubled from about 650 in 1960 to a high-water mark of 1,343 in 1978,9 by
1982 the inspectorate was down to 929.10 In 2008, WHD had only 709 investigative
staff.11 Even when WHD reached its highest staffing level, the economy was expanding much more rapidly, increasing the number of firms covered under the law. As a
result, the share of firms that WHD inspected fell from 9 percent in 1947 to 2 percent
by the late 1970s, and continued to decline afterward.12
Growth in the hardest-to-police sectors and among the hardest-to-protect workers. As the
preponderance of low-wage jobs has shifted from manufacturing to service, long
hours, low wages, high rates of injury, and sweeping violations of workplace laws
have followed workers there.13 These conditions are present in formal as well as informal employment, from the smallest establishments to some of the largest. In certain
industries and local labor markets, what Bernhardt et al. have christened the “glovesoff economy” has taken root and is expanding. In such settings, employers are “increasingly breaking, bending, or evading long-established laws and standards designed to
protect workers.”14
Part of the problem lies with an increase in the number of small firms. Between
1990 and 2005, there was a decline in the size of the average business establishment,
with a concomitant increase in the number of firms and establishments.15 Using
Current Population Survey data on actual hours worked and wages received, Weil and
Pyles generate a list of thirty-three industries at highest risk of wage and overtime
violations.16 We refined their findings by analyzing the composition of establishments
in those industries.17 Our analysis demonstrates that most of the industries Weil and
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Pyles identify as being at greatest risk of FLSA violations are overwhelmingly composed of establishments of fewer than twenty employees.18
The predominance of smaller firms and establishments in low-wage industries is
worth noting, not only because it seems to correlate with higher wage and hour violation rates, but also because it introduces complications for the design of enforcement
strategies.19 If the same number of workers are employed across a larger number of
smaller enterprises, more personnel are required to locate the businesses, travel to
them, and inspect their records. Small businesses are also less likely to have the sophisticated human resources departments and centralized record keeping that facilitate
proactive learning about the law, cooperation during inspections, and participation in
ongoing “regulatory communities.”20 On the very low-wage end of the ladder, small
firms are also more likely to be mobile, short-lived, and unregistered.
The growth of subcontracting as a business model introduces additional challenges
for enforcement.21 The rise of the network supply chain model has resulted in the vertical
disaggregation of firms across many sectors and in labor-intensive industries in particular.22 Even when small firms are embedded in subcontracting networks in which one
large firm or a few firms set the terms of exchange, they are often not the employers of
record for purposes of enforcement. FLSA drafters wrote the “Hot Goods” provision of
the law because they recognized the specific challenges posed by subcontracting. But
what was once viewed as an exception confined to the garment industry (and agriculture,
which was initially exempted from coverage altogether) has become more of a rule.
Meanwhile, studies by a range of states as well as the federal DOL have found up to 30
percent of firms23 misclassify employees as independent contractors to avoid liability
under FLSA and other workplace laws.24 For some employers, subcontracting and misclassification are tactics in a larger strategy to evade detection of noncompliance.
A final factor making enforcement difficult in the low-wage sector is the high percentage of immigrants in the most at-risk industries. In 2008, the foreign-born made up
about 15 percent of the U.S. civilian labor force and more than 20 percent of the lowwage workforce.25 Two of every five low-wage immigrant workers are undocumented.26
Immigrants constitute a significant share of many of the same industries Weil and Pyles
identify as having the highest violation rates: for example, 27 percent of all workers and
40 percent of low-wage workers in construction are foreign-born.27
Immigrants may be unaware of their rights, afraid of deportation, and hesitant to
cooperate with government officials. The U.S. government has implemented a policy
of work site raids and employer sanctions enforcement that has rendered immigrants
increasingly unwilling to come forward to report wage violations. The gap between
immigrant communities and regulators is a serious impediment to effective enforcement of wage and hour laws.

The Logics of Enforcement
The state of low-wage work also suffers from a failure to match the logics of enforcement deployed by government agencies to the realities of low-wage work today. We
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identify four logics of detection that have dominated wage enforcement over the past
century, addressing the strengths and weaknesses of each in relation to the current
low-wage context.
The logic of complaint-driven investigation. The logic that emerged in the early years of
FLSA was a complaint-driven approach to detection, premised on the assumption that
workers would come forward and inspections would be triggered by their complaints.28
Although during the 1940s and 1950s WHD strongly embraced a proactive investigation strategy alongside the complaint-based approach, after 1960 complaints would
become the predominant approach.29
Addressing worker complaints is clearly an important part of the work of a workplace enforcement agency. The question is whether this approach makes sense as the
predominant one. An affirmative answer would be appropriate if the industries logging
the largest number of complaints were also those with the worst underlying conditions.
However, research by Weil and Pyles found little overlap between industries with the
highest FLSA complaint rates and those with the highest wage and overtime noncompliance rates, suggesting that workers in industries with the worst conditions are
much less likely to complain.30 The DOL is thus expending most of its resources on
inspectors responding to complaints filed by individual workers, without an underlying justification that this approach is likely to be effective in detecting violators.
The logic of proactive investigations. In the case of low-wage industries, there is a
strong case for federal and state departments of labor to use data on underlying levels
of noncompliance to target specific industries in particular geographic areas. Since the
1940s, WHD has intermittently complemented its reliance on complaints with a focus
on proactive inspections, the second “logic” of enforcement.
In the 1990s, WHD launched directed enforcement programs in garment, agriculture, nursing homes, and poultry processing. These significant initiatives involved
new strategies—in particular, ratcheting up penalties and enlisting firms at the top of
supply chains to police their suppliers and contractors. In the garment industry, for
example, WHD initiated the “No Sweat” campaign in 1996, with the strategic goal
of moving from an exclusive focus on the least-powerful entity in the supply chain—
contractors—to manufacturers, retailers, and their production networks. Among its
many innovative features, No Sweat required manufacturers with high levels of violations to sign contractor monitoring agreements and used the FLSA Hot Goods provision to seize products that were made by contractors in violation of wage and overtime
laws, requiring manufacturers to give up financial gains from shipping those products.
WHD also expanded criminal prosecution and civil litigation and assessed civil monetary penalties for repeat and willful violators.31
Although the DOL’s initial assessment of its own results was pessimistic,32 a subsequent close analysis of DOL microdata by David Weil and Carlos Mallo reached a
considerably more positive conclusion. The analysis found that the contractors of Los
Angeles and New York City firms that signed monitoring agreements showed improvement in compliance rates.33 They attribute the effectiveness of this initiative to the use
of public enforcement to change the private incentives of targeted manufacturers and
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contractors, a prime example of what Weil terms “regulatory jujitsu”—the tailoring of
enforcement strategies to the structures and legal contours of particular industries.
Other industries targeted for WHD’s strategic enforcement initiatives yielded
mixed results. Despite a national WHD campaign in the long-term care industry
launched in 1997, noncompliance rates remained stubbornly high.34 An effort in poultry, however, appears to have resulted in some improvement in compliance.35 In the
view of Rae Glass, a top official at WHD through several Democrat and Republican
administrations, the key in this case was a strategy of civil litigation, which increased
the cost to processors of noncompliance.36
Despite this experimentation with proactive investigation, the second logic has not
taken root at the DOL as the predominant institutional model.
The logic of comprehensive coverage. For a time, at least in high-wage industrial
states, the number of federal inspectors was augmented by state labor departments
with their own sizeable inspectorates. Our interviews with state wage and hour officials reveal that some states had a large inspectorate that divided up the turf geographically and systematically patrolled it, on the theory that firms would comply in part
because they would anticipate inspection. This is what we think of as the third logic.
As an example, when Carmine Ruberto, now director of labor standards enforcement
at the New York Department of Labor, arrived at the agency in 1966, he joined a staff
of more than three hundred inspectors. He was assigned to a small section of the Bronx
and was expected to visit every business in his jurisdiction.37 In New Jersey, Mike
McCarthy, the recently retired head of the state Wage and Hour Division, told a very
similar story about going door-to-door in the Newark business district when he first
began as a labor inspector in the 1960s.
Resource constraints have taken this approach off the table. Today, state wage and
hour divisions are much smaller and take an overwhelmingly complaint-based
approach.38
The logic of self-regulation. Over the past quarter century, the workplace has been a
site for experimentation with various forms of “new regulatory” practice.39 This is
reflected in a trend toward self-regulation by firms in the arenas of health and safety
standards, wage enforcement, and discrimination, among others. We refer to the idea
that employers should monitor themselves as the fourth logic of enforcement.
Self-regulation made its first appearance at the DOL in 1969 with the WHD’s
Compliance Utilizing Education initiative. Although this program was largely abandoned by the 1980s,40 WHD revitalized the employer cooperation approach during the
Bush era, approaching firms as the primary partners of WHD and further reducing
reliance on penalties and court actions. During the mid-2000s, WHD initiated a series
of “partnership agreements” with employers that largely involved outreach and education.41 A small number of these agreements provided guidelines for employers to monitor themselves or their contractors for potential FLSA violations. During this period,
WHD signed agreements to a much lesser extent with other entities, including a very
few worker associations and foreign consulates.
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Scholars of self-regulation broadly recognize its limitations in a context of small
employers and low-wage workers. For example, Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledge
that small firms do not have the resources to undertake the enforced self-regulation
that the two scholars otherwise strongly advocate.42 Legal scholar Cynthia Estlund,
whose recent book calls for employee representation as a part of self-regulation in the
context of low-wage work sites, likewise emphasizes the need for an ongoing role for
government enforcement in the lowest-wage sectors.43 We find further support for
such concern in our reading of scholars who have assessed the implementation and
impact of Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) self-regulatory
programs and, on that basis, caution that such an approach is unlikely to be effective
where unions are not present or where firms are small.44 We share these concerns
about the turn toward self-regulation. Without a consistently enforced public regime of
penalties for noncompliance, self-regulation would likely contribute to the further
degeneration of standards in low-wage sectors.45
To conclude, then, while the first and second logics of complaint-driven inspections
and strategic targeting remain essential to any government enforcement strategy, they
have proven insufficient to address the problem of noncompliance in low-wage sectors.
The third logic of comprehensive coverage is no longer a realistic possibility, and the
fourth logic of self-regulation has limited use in the context of the lowest-wage work.

II. Imagining a Regulatory Regime
Our Proposal
How should we retool workplace enforcement? We believe that government must
remain central to efforts to ensure compliance with minimum workplace standards,
despite serious resource constraints. Since there will never be enough government
inspectors to cover all low-wage businesses, we propose the creation of a system that
draws on the complementary strengths of government and civil society organizations.
Our ideas build on the work of David Weil, whose core argument is that agencies
such as WHD get stuck in enforcement patterns that are increasingly out of sync with
the changed structure of work today.46 To fix this, regulators need to figure out where
the problems really are and shift resources there. WHD is impeded in this process by
its tendency to focus on the largest firms in an industry47 and by its overwhelming reliance on complaints.48 Weil calls for WHD to take a strategic approach by targeting
resources toward high-noncompliance industries and “to larger-scale industry or geographic initiatives . . . in order to enhance the deterrence and systemic impacts of their
efforts.”49 He emphasizes the importance of regulatory action that interacts with networks of employers rather than single firms, crafted in ways that respond to the structure of particular industries.50 With Pyles, Weil also argues for the need for a close
relationship between regulators and labor-market intermediaries.51
In our view, an improved wage enforcement strategy for WHD would include a
focus on both reactive (i.e., complaint-based) and proactive investigation strategies.
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We share Weil and Pyles’s concerns that complaint-driven approaches can divert
resources from the most serious problems. So long as incoming cases are prioritized
and resources allocated in a way that reflects their potential impact on the most serious
problems, however, we see complaints as having an important role to play.
On the proactive side, we agree that a more successful regulatory approach would
encompass affirmative enforcement strategies specifically tailored to particular industries, based on access to accurate and complete information about relevant actors and
their practices. Another central element of a new regime would be meaningful penalties, collected with enough frequency to generate real deterrence.52 Our primary focus,
however, lies in extending the reach of the inspectorate to increase the likelihood that
firms in the low-wage sector will be actively regulated in the first place. The third and
most important element of what we propose is to augment labor inspectorates by giving public interest groups like unions and worker centers a formal, ongoing role in the
detection of violations. As noted earlier, employers have been an intermittent presence
in the DOL’s enforcement strategy for more than half a century.53 We do not advocate
abandoning this engagement with firms, although we might reshape it. Instead, we call
for the missing leg to be added: a muscular role for third-party worker representatives
who possess deep knowledge of specific industries or local labor markets and ongoing
relationships with workers.

The Roots of What We Propose
Our idea harkens back to a logic of enforcement proposed during the debate about
institutional design and modes of enforcement at the time of FLSA’s drafting.54 The
original architects of FLSA argued that the law should be enacted not “to provide
workers with affirmative rights, but because the lack of such regulation violated trade
practices, giving sweatshop employers an unfair competitive advantage.” To enforce
the law, they proposed the establishment of a quasi-judicial agency, the Fair Labor
Standards Board, modeled after the Fair Trade Commission, which would work with
“enlightened employers and unions” who would “band together and help police
sweatshop employers.”55 Continuing concern on the part of Roosevelt administration
officials about how the Supreme Court would interpret the Commerce Clause,56 pressure from southern Democrats and farm state Republicans to restrict coverage,57 and
opposition from American Federation of Labor (AFL) and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) national leaders—who feared DOL wage-fixing powers would
weaken private collective bargaining agreements—all contributed to the promulgation
of a much weaker bill.58
Lawmakers removed the unfair trade provisions, replaced the original proposal to
set industry-specific wage standards with one overall minimum wage, and provided no
regulatory role for unions. They established a weak quasi-legislative body under the
DOL appointed by the president; made WHD dependent upon funds provided from the
general budget of the DOL; and appointed inspectors through the civil service rules,
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giving the WHD administrator little control over them. WHD had no authority to issue
cease-and-desist orders against employers, and fines were set extremely low.
Despite union opposition to the original proposal, at the time of FLSA’s passage the
AFL still saw itself playing a central role in FLSA enforcement.59 In fact, the enforcement provision of FLSA as passed by Congress allowed for opt-in class-action suits
with a possible role for unions as worker representatives,60 but Congress eliminated
this possibility in the Portal to Portal Act in 1947. As Marc Linder recounts, by repealing the provision in FLSA that allowed workers to have a representative sue on their
behalf, and requiring each person’s written consent to be included in a class-action
suit, Congress effectively barred unions from bringing class actions under FLSA.61
We further root our proposal in Ayres and Braithwaite’s robust system of tripartism,
in which, along with the government regulator and the firm, a “public interest group”
such as a union or some other community-based worker organization is given a formal
role in the regulatory process. Likewise, our proposal is rooted in Joshua Cohen and
Joel Rogers’s call for government to draw on “the distinctive capacity of associations
to gather local information, monitor behavior and promote cooperation among private
actors”62 by assigning enforcement duties as well as other roles to third-party groups.
Cohen and Rogers identify the situation where the government has adequately set
standards but is unable to monitor compliance because the affected sites are too
diverse, numerous, and unstable—precisely the case in the low-wage sector—as a
situation where the participation of third-party associations is particularly urgent.63

Our Vision for the Partnerships
In the wake of the marked decline of union representation in the United States (and in
the lowest-wage industries, where union density has always been minimal), scholars
have rarely asked what workers’ organizations and government agencies might do in
collaboration. The exception has been Weil, who together with Pyles has affirmatively
called for a role for workers’ organizations in channeling complaints to regulators
regarding health/safety and wage/hour violations.64 While Weil and Pyles are persuasive in arguing that involving workers’ organizations would increase the likelihood
that the worst-off workers would complain of serious violations, we believe there are
additional reasons such groups should have a role in enforcement. More importantly,
we see the need for a detailed exploration not just of the why but the how: how might
such collaborations be structured and how might they function?
There is a long but sporadic history of collaborations between government and civil
society organizations in the context of the workplace. WHD has long experimented
with partnerships with employers’ organizations and has also attempted more limited
collaborations with a few groups advocating for workers.65 Several state departments
of labor have gone farther in attempting ongoing partnerships with workers’ organizations to enforce wage and hour laws, and a number of state attorneys general have
launched innovative programs to combat wage violations, including at times joining
with workers’ centers and unions in particular industry-based campaigns.66
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Most of these examples, however, have been ad hoc rather than rooted in policy. As
a result, they are perennially vulnerable to changes in political regime and agency
leadership and to constraints imposed at times of budgetary belt-tightening. Many
partnerships are campaign-based—that is, the parties come together only to target a
particular employer or industry. What we offer here, first in the abstract and then in our
three case studies, is a closer examination of what it might mean for the government
to collaborate with workers’ organizations in a sustained way, complementing its
existing partnerships with employers. Much of what we propose could be implemented
administratively, without any amendment of FLSA.67
We start with the presumption that to have a meaningful impact on government
enforcement, collaborations must be ongoing and robust. They must be formalized (so
the parties openly negotiate their expectations of and commitments to each other,
including regarding the distribution of resources; this is also important to render partnerships less vulnerable to changes in leadership), sustained (so that relationships
between the staff of the agency and the organizations have time to build, increasing the
resiliency of the bond in the face of conflict, and so that lessons learned can enrich the
next stages of the collaboration), and vigorous (so that the role of third-party partners
is not symbolic, marginal, or merely consultative but fully integrated into the work of
the agency). The partnerships must also be adequately resourced—states must allocate
enough staff to mount a credible effort and provide a threshold level of financial support to partner organizations that need it to fully participate.68
Each partnership will work differently, depending on its context and goals and also
on the political support it is able to garner. It is perhaps easiest to imagine the possible
points of collaboration as a menu of options tied to core regulatory functions.
With regard to outreach, workers organizations might target local firms and groups
of workers for informational visits and trainings. With regard to the detection of violations, the trust that worker centers command in immigrant communities, their links to
immigrant networks, their linguistic and cultural competency, and the credible assurances they can provide that a complaint to DOL funneled through the center will not
reach the ears of immigration authorities make it likely that a workers’ center will hear
of a violation before the government does. Beyond acting as a collection point for
claims against employers, workers’ organizations could proactively patrol the community, reporting evidence of violations to the agency and dramatically expanding the
DOL’s reach. To the extent that such groups were deputized to visit businesses, a possibility explored below, their presence on the beat would exponentially increase the
chance that a firm would be inspected and, thus, raise the cost the rational firm expected
to bear for violating the law.
With regard to the filing and investigation of complaints, one strategy would be to
designate civil society groups as sites where workers could register complaints with
the DOL. In the fullest version of the model, workers’ organizations could file claims
with the government on behalf of workers who remained anonymous, triggering an
investigation without putting specific workers at risk. Such organizations could also
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use their access to networks and community contacts to find prior employees of the
firm and gather evidence to be used in the case.
With regard to designing proactive strategies for enforcement, workers’ organizations could use the knowledge of their members to help identify the industry-specific
leverage points necessary to move forward with “regulatory jujitsu” strategies to
increase compliance that are retrofitted to the structure of particular industries.69 A
complementary approach would be to key a collaborative strategy to violation levels.
Under this approach, when compliance fell under a certain percentage in an industry,
the DOL would convene a task force for that industry—with representation from the
agency, employers, and workers’ organizations—to analyze the relationship between
the structure of the industry and widespread violations. The task force would then create and implement a proactive plan to increase industry compliance. Alternatively,
when workers’ organizations identified an industry with high levels of violations, they
might initiate a joint campaign with the DOL to target that industry.
With regard to ongoing deterrence, ultimately we believe that monetary penalties
must be drastically increased and applied frequently, license revocation must be a
meaningful possibility, and statutes of limitations must be either abolished or dramatically extended. We maintain this despite powerful arguments by prominent regulatory
scholars that strategies based too much on punishment can engender a “subculture of
resistance to regulation wherein methods of legal resistance and counterattack are
incorporated into industry socialization.”70 In Ayres and Braithwaite’s model of
responsive regulation, regulators work their way up a pyramid of enforcement techniques, beginning with persuasion and only reaching significant penalties after all else
has failed.71 They argue that drastic punishment as a first resort will backfire, because
inspectors will think the penalties do not fit the crime and will not use them. If the third
logic of comprehensive coverage were in effect, we would endorse this model. But
many of the firms in the low-wage sector are unlikely to ever be visited by an inspector, let alone effectively monitored over a period of time. Ayres and Braithwaite recognize this problem and argue for “making an example of a cheat in a single episode by
iterated escalation of punishment.”72 We agree that escalation is the right approach in
a world of repeat encounters between regulators and regulated firms. But in a setting
where there are few repeat encounters, a more assertive approach is required to disrupt
the status quo. As an initial stance, inspectors must make clear that systematically
noncompliant firms should expect to pay a high price immediately (even if they eventually negotiate something less painful in exchange for broad behavioral change). This
approach should be sustained until a new set point of compliance is reached.73
How likely is it that what we propose here could be executed in reality and at a
meaningful scale? As a first step in answering this question, we identified cases of formalized partnerships between workers’ organizations and government agencies that
seek to raise levels of compliance with prevailing wage or minimum-wage laws. In the
next section, we describe each partnership, highlight the components that seem most
promising, and note concerns that have emerged over the course of the collaborations.
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III.Three Case Studies
Los Angeles Unified School District and Board of Public Works
Deputization Programs
Description. Since 1996, the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) has
administered a program that trains and deputizes business representatives of building
trades unions to enforce the prevailing wage on district projects, which are funded by
nearly $30 billion in school construction bonds.74 The program grew out of a commitment that building trade unions “would not strike over issues on jobs if the LAUSD
would set up an internal compliance enforcement department,” according to Richard
Slawson, executive secretary of the Los Angeles County Building and Construction
Trades Council, AFL-CIO.75 In 2004, a similar program was established by the Los
Angeles Board of Public Works (LABPW), which in that fiscal year had oversight
over 308 projects with a value of close to $339 million.76
The in-house Labor Compliance Program77 of the LAUSD trains business agents as
work preservation volunteers (WPVs); provides them with identification badges and
business cards; and authorizes them to enter school sites to “conduct labor compliance
site visits, interview workers on District property . . . and assist with audits, hearings,
and review conferences.”78 The LABPW’s deputized inspectors, called compliance
group representatives (CGRs), are similarly trained and badged. Both programs seek
to make business agents the “eyes, ears and foot soldiers” of city inspectors.79 Agents
interview employees about hours worked, wages, job classification, official duties,
and problems receiving pay, and they fill out wage-complaint forms with workers on
the spot when violations are found. They do not determine violations or assess penalties but provide the raw data that city inspectors use to put together cases. They must
attend trainings and renew their badges each year. “The authorization is everything,”
says Slawson. “If you go out there badged by the agency responsible for enforcing
prevailing wage they have to cooperate.”
Both of these programs had to overcome initial opposition to the idea of union
participation from city officials. According to John Reamer, director of the Bureau of
Contract Administration, labor compliance managers and contract administrators had
two major reservations about the program: that building trades unions would target
nonunion contractors rather than enforcing prevailing wage, and that it would interfere
with the inspectors’ control over access to the job site, providing contractors with an
excuse for delays. In addition to management’s concerns, line inspectors worried that
the program reflected an intent to eventually subcontract out their jobs.80
To forestall objections that business representatives would advance a unionorganizing agenda, they are required to sign an agreement prohibiting using the program to promote or gather intelligence for the union, disparage nonunion contractors,
or review project data not associated with a pending complaint.81 Union representatives have almost always complied with these prohibitions. Mark Hovatter, director of
contracts for the LAUSD, says that out of two thousand contracts in five years he had
“probably a dozen” complaints.82 Since initiation of the LAUSD program, one-third of
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the repeat contractors working with LAUSD continue to be nonunion. Likewise, in four
years of the LABPW program’s operation, there have been ten total violations of the similarly constructed Rules of Engagement. Government administrators believe that business
agents view the ability to combat unfair competition as a strong enough incentive (and the
risk of having their badge withdrawn a strong enough disincentive) to avoid abuse.
CGRs and WPVs have been extremely proactive, effectively operating as LAUSD’s
and LABPW’s directed enforcement team.83 The programs have significantly extended
the capacity of the city inspectorate, traditionally focused on quality of workmanship
rather than labor compliance.84 In 2009, the 85 CGRs expanded the LABPW inspectorate of 244 by more than 30 percent. Over four years, the Office of Contract
Compliance has had 742 requests from CGRs to visit 168 work sites, granting 559 of
them. These visits resulted in 1,155 interviews, which turned up 161 cases of possible
underpayment of wage violations.
Ultimately, department leaders say their fears of union misconduct did not come to
pass and that the program has been a great boon for them. Chris Jenson, a top official
who has been at the Bureau of Contract Administration from the beginning of the program, states, “I was initially the biggest opponent, however the program has been very
successful and there have been very few and very minor problems.”85 Likewise, Reamer
has been so happy with the program that he is “looking to take it citywide.” “For us, it
was a great wedding in the sense that we have limited staff, and we got knowledgeable
volunteers from the trades,” he said. While LABPW leaders do not feel they can state
categorically that the program discouraged contractor misbehavior, they felt that the
program enabled them to identify more of it. Furthermore, Reamer noted, the program
augments public resources, especially important following an almost 50 percent reduction in the LAUSD’s labor compliance staff since the financial crisis.86 The programs
have attracted no organized opposition, and the state Division of Industrial Relations
and the city of Los Angeles have lauded the LAUSD initiative.
Inspectors’ attitudes toward the CGRs have likewise shifted dramatically, according to Jenson. “When the program began, one of the inspectors said to me there is no
way in hell I will ever let one of these guys come onto one of my jobsites. . . now I get
calls from the inspectors asking can you send one of those guys out? Can you send
someone who speaks Spanish or Korean? Very often, I can come up with someone.”87
In one wage underpayment claim, for example, CGRs were able to expand the case
from two workers to twelve: “My case went from fair to phenomenal,” said Jenson.
The availability of CGRs has been especially valuable for weekend coverage.
Furthermore, CGRs have made the inspectors more representative. According to
Slawson, while African Americans are still underrepresented, virtually all trades in
Los Angeles today have quite significant Latino memberships, and most reflect this in
the ranks of their paid staff.
Assessment. The LAUSD and LABPW programs in many ways represent the strongest version of what we call for. They are ongoing rather than campaign-driven, with
the feel of deputies walking an industrial beat. That the program is enshrined in public
law, rather than operating as a project of a particular administration, speaks well for its
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permanence. In addition, these programs are a good example of Weil’s “regulatory
jujitsu” approach: they benefit from business representatives’ knowledge of sectorspecific dynamics; are contoured to the set of rules and regulations that apply to public
construction; and have access to vast quantities of information due to the requirement
that contractors register with the city and submit copies of their payroll weekly, as well
as through the public bidding process, which makes detailed data about labor and
materials costs available for each bid.
What is most exciting about the Los Angeles Joint Labor Compliance Monitoring
programs is the formal power wielded by the labor volunteers as a result of deputization. Although there have been labor-management compliance groups in the construction industry for years, contractors can refuse them access. The fact that the city vests
CGRs with formal authority means that contractors are more likely to treat them as
they would treat city inspectors. Although the programs are unfunded, the participating unions are willing to fund their own participation because their incentives are
closely aligned with the program requirements. Union members benefit directly when
union contractors are not underbid through false means.
Our principal concern is that it is difficult to tell whether the programs have reduced
the number of prevailing-wage violations in Los Angeles. There is no clear pattern in
the annual data before and since the creation of the labor-compliance programs.88 On
the other hand, while LABPW officials were more equivocal, LAUSD government
administrators were absolutely certain that compliance had increased significantly as
a result of the program. If the program is not yet reaching its potential for impact, one
issue may be inspectors’ reluctance to use available penalties. When prevailing-wage
laws are violated, California law provides for fines and liquidated damages, withholding of contract payments,89 and eventual debarment (removal from the list to get public work). In practice, Reamer notes, the penalties actually assessed in the majority of
cases are not severe enough to remove the incentive a contractor has to cheat.
“Debarring more is what it would take [to raise compliance levels],” says LABPW’s
Jenson; but debarment is much more time-consuming than other avenues, which has
limited his department’s use of that route.90
An additional concern about this model relates to the fact that, historically, building
trade unions have excluded African Americans and other people of color from their
ranks. Although the trades in Los Angeles have begun to address this problem, tensions persist, and in many cities this is still a major issue. Among other problems, this
could result in a lack of representativeness among deputies and make communication
with non-union workers difficult.

Partnership between the California Labor Commission’s Janitorial
Enforcement Team and the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund
Description. In 2006, California’s Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)
established its Janitorial Enforcement Team (JET), which includes an attorney, a criminal investigator, three deputy labor commissioners, and three partners from the
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Employment Development Department. JET has a close working relationship with the
Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund (MCTF), a janitorial watchdog organization
established in 1999 by Local #1877 of the Service Employees International Union and
its signatory contractors. JET was established by the state in response to pressure from
MCTF and other advocates, following revelations of persistent violations in the janitorial industry. A multiagency janitorial task force set up by the Los Angeles District
Attorney’s office provided one early model.91 Lilia Garcia, Executive Director of
MCTF, sought its replication at the state Department of Labor.92 Instead, in 2005 Governor Schwarzenegger initiated a statewide coalition focused on a few low-wage, subcontracted industries, including janitorial. MCTF grew frustrated with the coalition’s
practice of using sweeps to find easy-to-identify violations, rather than the thorough
investigations necessary to uncover unpaid wages. Eventually, the acting Labor Commissioner agreed to establish JET to focus on janitorial wage and hour violations.
The argument for JET was that policing the janitorial sector required inspectors
with specific knowledge of industry structures and strategies. Henry Huerta, the veteran inspector placed in charge of JET, argues, “In order to be effective, you have to
understand the method of operation of a particular business, how subcontracting and
franchising agreements work, and to do that, the whole system needs to be understood.”93 According to MCTF, there are more than twelve thousand janitorial companies in California, but only half are registered with the state as legitimate businesses.
In the supermarket sector, for example, large chains routinely contract janitorial work
to cleaning contractors, which subcontract the actual work at a significant reduction to
labor recruiters. “If you did the math, [with] what the contractor paid [it] would be
almost impossible for a labor subcontractor to comply with minimum wage, overtime,
meal and rest periods and workers compensation insurance for these workers,”
explained Huerta.94 Under CL 2810, an innovative California labor law adopted in
2003, it is illegal to subcontract services without adequate funding.95 For the DLSE to
bring cases under this provision, however, workers needed to come forward with qualifying claims.96
It is here that the partnership with the MCTF has proved essential. JET alone represents an important innovation, but it would not have succeeded without the MCTF,
whose twelve inspectors—many of them longtime janitors—more than quadruple
JET’s investigative capacity. MCTF provides state inspectors with specialized industry knowledge. In addition, of the three cases presented here, MCTF is the only organization that is employer-funded.97 The forty unionized employers who participate in
MCTF have a self-interest in policing the industry. Employers, who also include nonunion contractors, are strongly engaged in the program.
MCTF plays a critical role in helping to assemble the documentation necessary for
the state to bring cases. Understanding that few workers will come either to them or to
government, MCTF inspectors routinely go out to worksites at night, during janitors’
peak working hours. They identify the full scope of the subcontractor’s operation and
build cases through systematic “reconstruction” when workers lack pay stubs. They
identify and interview each worker, determining which contractor employed him or her,
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and establishing the dates and hours worked. They use the state’s formula to create a
“wage audit” estimate of what the worker is owed. Through MCTF’s work, inspectors
know what the payroll should look like, and have a group of flesh-and-blood workers
willing to bring cases.98 Where government inspectors were reluctant to exercise their
authority to demand wages on behalf of all employees of a firm, saying they could not
identify workers who had filed claims, MCTF suggested subpoenaing contracts and
seizing work schedules posted in subcontractors’ homes to figure out staffing.
While JET’s inspectors must still carry out independent investigations, MCTF provides them with much of the raw material. JET investigators now accept cases from
MCTF as opposed to requiring that workers approach DLSE directly.99 This is a significant departure from the past, when the overwhelming message, according to
Huerta, was that investigators were not supposed to accept information from organizations or work cooperatively with them. In his view, JET has been able to overcome this
obstacle because inspectors have come to view MCTF’s work as making their own
jobs easier to do.100 Frank Capetillo, an investigator assigned to JET from the beginning and now in charge of it, agreed that MCTF’s work has been very useful.
Nonetheless, Capetillo stresses the need for government inspectors to maintain their
independence: “Many times these organizations are quite adamant about what they
want you to do with your cases. . . . You don’t want to end up working for them.”101
Garcia and Huerta argue that the partnership has galvanized government inspectors to
pursue violators much more aggressively. Capetillo corroborated this view: “I understand the industry a lot more and the schemes that are behind the violations that employers are doing because I have concentrated on this program.”102 Garcia also believes that
JET inspectors have become more invested in improving the enforcement process.103 In
an example of JET’s increasingly proactive approach, state attorneys are becoming
involved much earlier in the life of the case rather than waiting until a complaint is filed.
Other issues have proven more contentious. State law permits JET to pursue joint
employer cases, holding liable all entities that share the status of “employer.” DLSE
and MCTF disagree, however, about how many of twelve factors indicating joint
employment must be present in order for a case to be brought. Garcia has been frustrated by the state’s reluctance to pursue such cases, which she believes to be the real
key to transformation in the restaurant and big-box industries.
Since the partnership began, there have been an unprecedented number of administrative, civil, and criminal actions brought against unscrupulous employers, resulting in
more than $38 million in back pay for janitorial workers. In 2007 the State Labor
Commissioner and the attorney general filed charges for $5 million in nonpayment of
wages against two janitorial contractors for several restaurant chains.104 In 2008, the
Labor Commissioner filed the first suit under CL 2810 against a major building service
company for close to $2 million,105 and in 2009 the Labor Commissioner sued Corporate
Building Services and its subcontractors for approximately $7.4 million.106 As an indication of the impact JET has had, Capetillo points to large companies that provide janitorial
services to the hotel industry, which have abandoned contractors that JET has found in
violation of the law and now “look for companies that are in compliance.” Garcia and
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Huerta also point to the partnership’s work in the supermarket sector, which has cost
stores $22 million and ultimately resulted in 3,000 janitorial jobs being brought back into
the formal sector, as supermarkets, too, began to closely scrutinize contracts.107
Assessment. This partnership provides a compelling picture of how ongoing collaboration between a state agency and knowledgeable third-party organization can
work on the ground, without deputization but with intensive collaboration and mutual
trust. Just as the LAUSD and LABPW examples violated an old taboo against deputization, this partnership challenges ingrained agency opposition to close cooperation,
including accepting documentation developed by third parties. This case is particularly noteworthy for the way the collaboration has overcome information barriers in
the private sector. The murky world of janitorial subcontracting bids and payroll
records occupies the opposite end of the spectrum from the prevailing-wage contracts
in publicly funded construction, but MCTF investigators have developed an impressive capacity to reveal the inner workings and interrelationships of employers. This
ability is essential to JET’s success, and it is concentrated much more in the hands of
MCTF than the state. This program is also an excellent example of “industry jujitsu”
in two regards: its industry-specific nature (including attention to the differences
between subsectors such as restaurants vs. supermarkets) and its coupling with a specific penalty in the form of CL 2810.
While the partnership is clearly having an impact, to definitively shift the cost-benefit
calculations of companies, more of the rest of the state’s field enforcement program
would need to be modeled after this program, and it would need to be augmented with a
streamlined wage-complaint process, criminal referrals, and increased fines and penalties. To date, according to Huerta and Garcia, JET has not catalyzed the establishment of
similar teams for other low-wage industries. Garcia and Huerta both said that MCTF has
worked best with ground level deputies and is most likely to incur resistance from middle managers. They felt that overcoming this resistance would take extremely strong
leadership from the top of the agency, which has not been forthcoming.108 Our own
interviews confirmed this view. When asked whether he viewed JET as a model that
other state departments of labor should adopt, Dean Fryer, a spokesman for the
Department of Industrial Relations, was cautious: “As a general approach, I don’t think
it would be the way to go . . . there are violations in all industries—we have to be able to
address them and to concentrate staff in one industry pulls staff away from other areas.”109
Our final concern has to do with the long-term political viability of the program. Of
the three cases, this is the only one without a formal agreement between government
agents and the outside partners. Furthermore, as in the New York case that follows,
JET was established by a specific administrator and could be discontinued or curtailed
in its work by a less favorably inclined appointee.

New York Wage and Hour Watch
Description. The Wage and Hour Watch (W&HW) program of the New York State
Department of Labor is a formal partnership between the DOL and six organizations110
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to conduct oversight in specific geographic areas with heavy concentrations of lowwage employers. When we were researching and writing this article, W&HW was at
an early stage. As a result, our discussion of W&HW relates to the program design
rather than to outcomes.
In the summer of 2009, DOL and the groups signed a memorandum of agreement
committing the organizations to identify and train at least six individuals to serve as
“Wage and Hour Watch Members” for two years. In their “Wage and Hour Watch
Zone,” members provide at least fifty businesses per quarter with labor-law compliance brochures, and hold informational sessions about labor laws for the public.
W&HW groups are also charged with referring potential labor-law violations to the
DOL. Members will not, however, carry out inspections.111 The memorandum of
agreement commits the DOL to providing members with training and outreach materials with space for the organizations’ contact information. DOL commits to designating
a W&HW contact within the Division of Labor Standards to administer the program,
taking complaints and communicating with organizations regarding the status of
investigations “to the extent allowable by law,” providing a page on the DOL’s Web site
that describes project participants and their areas of work, and participating in quarterly
telephone calls with the groups. DOL has weathered deep budget cuts as a result of the
fiscal crisis, and so is unable to provide any funding to participating groups.
W&HW has its roots in eight years of close collaboration between government
officials and a set of worker centers and unions that began under Eliot Spitzer when he
was elected attorney general in 1998 and continued when he became governor in 2007.
Lawyers in Spitzer’s Labor Bureau had worked with unions and worker centers in an
effort to ratchet up labor-standards enforcement in low-wage, immigrant-heavy service industries, including green grocers, small retail chains, restaurants, dry cleaners,
and laundromats. Shortly after becoming governor, Spitzer appointed Patricia Smith,
architect of the Labor Bureau’s low-wage worker initiatives, to be commissioner of
labor (Smith is now solicitor general at the U.S. DOL). Smith hired several veterans of
the Labor Bureau to work with her at NYS DOL, and they brought with them the relationships with community partners and the strategic repertoires they had forged during
their years at the attorney general’s office. Several top staff came from the ranks of
worker and immigrant-advocacy organizations; although now government employees,
they perceived the low-wage labor market through activist eyes. In another indication
of their high regard for advocates, NYS DOL implemented a number of administrative
and policy suggestions from a wage-theft coalition organized by the Brennan Center,
an NYU-based research and policy think tank.112
During deliberations over models, DOL rejected the idea of any kind of deputization
of members proposed by the participating groups. In the context of a powerful union
representing the inspectors and an entrenched culture in the inspectorate, it did not
make sense to DOL leaders to push deputization.113 The organizations also realized that
deputization might pose difficulties, since some of their more active members were not
legally authorized to work in the United States. DOL also has no plan to prioritize cases
that originate through W&HW, because the department says it has already instituted a
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triage system meant to ensure that the most serious cases are addressed first.114 There is
likewise no explicit plan for DOL to follow members’ neighborhood canvasses of
employers with formal sweeps (although this could change), but employers receiving
brochures through W&HW will be considered to have been educated about the law,
facilitating the DOL’s ability to consider them willful violators subject to additional
monetary penalties.
NYSDOL and the groups describe their effort as a “neighborhood watch” model.
According to Deborah Axt, director of legal and support services at Make the Road
New York, one of the participating organizations, the conception was “people who live
in a neighborhood, and care about the safety of the neighborhood . . . organized to keep
tabs on what is happening in the neighborhood, to keep an eye out for danger and . . .
to be able to trigger some enforcement activities by government.”115 While there is no
clear-cut theory in terms of exactly how the effort will result in deterrence, the overall
goal is to educate employers, raise the profile of wage violations, and unearth increased
numbers of strong cases, which—once pursued by the DOL—will send a message to
some type of community of employers who will respond by coming into compliance.
Deputy Commissioner Terri Gerstein, who is in charge of the program, also feels that
with more of a neighborhood presence there is also a greater likelihood that workers
who would have otherwise been reluctant to complain will come forward.116
Assessment. What we find most compelling about W&HW is its conception of continuing partnerships, involving parties that already have a long history of working
together. The formal agreement provides an accountability mechanism and a baseline
to improve through experience working together. W&HW will also increase the number of people “walking a beat” in low-wage labor markets, potentially exponentially.
Because members are drawn from the same linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups as
workers and come from organizations rooted in specific geographic, ethnic, occupational, or industrial sectors, we would rate highly their ability to uncover problems and
generate complaints.
The fact that the partnership agreement is not explicit about groups taking responsibility for delineated sectors might be of concern, because we are persuaded that the
most effective strategies respond to industry dynamics and take advantage of industryspecific regulatory frameworks. However, so far most of the partner groups are themselves sectorally focused. In addition, we need to be realistic. Union density is low in
many low-wage industries, and community organizations and worker centers (the
most likely actors to respond in unions’ absence) work across a wide swath of the lowwage labor market. Such organizations could still partner with the state’s strategic
enforcement division to target specific industries, using industry-specific tools.
We wonder, though, whether the state has committed enough from its side.
Organizations already making do on lean budgets commit to add additional work without any more resources. This is of particular concern since W&HW is the only one
among our case studies that involves worker centers as well as unions. Unlike unions,
worker centers often have very small budgets and depend on foundations for the vast
majority of their financial support. While unions may be able to build walking a beat
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into their daily work funded through member dues, for worker centers and other community organizations, the day-in and day-out work of policing—the aspect of W&HW
that we expect to be the most critical—is the least fundable through philanthropic dollars. It is appropriate, and in fact routine in other fields of endeavor, for private organizations that accept responsibility for important public work to receive state funding.
This is not to say that organizations gain nothing from an unfunded partnership. In
addition to a potential strategic boost, the worker centers also gain an imprimatur of
legitimacy through the program, which in turn can be helpful with private
fund-raising.
While dramatic shifts have taken place at the top of the NYS DOL, thorough institutional reform of the inspectorate is at an early stage. We understand that when conflicts occur between organizations and inspectors, W&HW members have access to
highly placed individuals to whom they can appeal and get quick action to fix specific
cases.117 The key question is whether DOL is able to institutionalize a culture of
aggressiveness, creativity, and partnership within the inspectorate itself and not just
among top leadership. Furthermore, given that the program is so dependent on the
relationships and commitments of the actors currently involved, we have concerns
about its sustainability in future administrations.
Finally, at this early stage, it remains an open question whether W&HW will generate the deterrence it aspires to. W&HW members have little power. Mostly they will
do educational outreach to employers and workers, with no additional tools to increase
compliance. We are heartened, however, that the DOL has administratively implemented several strategies for ratcheting up the costs of noncompliance. Another hopeful sign involves an effort to bring about an internal shift in culture, from one favoring
settlement with employers—usually at a ratio of about ten cents per dollar owed—to
one that stands firm, requiring much higher payment amounts to settle and taking
employers to court if they refuse.

IV. Answering Objections
The preceding three cases embody many of the features of the robust partnerships
proposed. All have the potential to be sustained rather than campaign-delimited, to at
least potentially involve substantive activities being carried out by groups, and to
require substantive collaboration with government inspectors on an ongoing basis.
Two of the three are officially chartered projects with clear administrative procedures
and agreements that the parties must sign.
With these examples on the table, we are in a better position to give serious consideration to objections that our proposal raises.

Objection 1: Political Infeasibility
The most straightforward objection to what we propose is that it is likely to generate
political resistance, particularly at the federal level. While we do not envision our
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model being implemented wholesale in the next few years, the growing number of
experiments at the local and state level allows us to respond to political objections
with concrete evidence.
One political objection relates to the fear that the workers’ organizations would
abuse the power granted to them. For example, the deputization idea has recently been
characterized as “government-approved vigilantism.”118 Yet while a vigilante is a person who takes the law into his or her own hands, our proposal is for unions and worker
centers to use legal means of bringing companies to justice. In every case we have
studied, and in the model we propose, it is the government, not the organizations, that
determines whether a case merits further investigation by a labor inspector, and ultimately whether to levy fines and penalties. There has also been resistance to the idea
that unions and other workers’ organizations can play a meaningful role in preparing
cases for the government to pursue. Yet for three years, MCTF’s investigators have
been reconstructing payroll records and putting together cases for use by government
inspectors. There is no indication that they have provided incorrect information or
acted inappropriately. All evidence points to their contributions to the substantiation of
claims and ultimately to a change in employer behavior in the industry. A related concern is that unions and worker centers might lack a nuanced understanding of how the
regulations they seek to enforce play out in real life: that they will see in black and
white rather than shades of gray. While we agree that wage and hour laws are complicated, unions and especially worker centers have built up tremendous tacit knowledge
about specific industry structures and practices, as well as the subtleties of applying
wage and overtime statutes that can vary significantly between industries.
Opponents might also object that monitors from labor unions could use the program
to pursue unionization or to protect a closed shop. As we note above, these concerns do
not appear to have been borne out in practice in our case study that involved deputization. That one-third of repeat contractors in both the public works and school construction areas in Los Angeles were nonunion both before and after the program supports the
claims administrators made that the programs have not resulted in closed-shop hegemony. In fact, we think it is advantageous that unions and unionized firms have a very
strong incentive (and often the resources) to police the labor market in industries where
they have a presence in order to eliminate unfair competition. If firms are compelled to
respect minimum-wage and overtime laws, they will be forced to compete on bases
other than savings gained through violations of the law. There is no guarantee, however,
that their employees will be any more likely to choose to affiliate with a union.
A related objection is that giving unions a role in enforcement will be giving them
a tool to intimidate employers and will lead businesses, especially small businesses, to
feel threatened and “outgunned” by big unions. In an era in which a majority of firms
in certain sectors are not complying with basic wage and hour laws—and in which it
has become normal for firms to engage in illegal activity to resist unions—it seems
somewhat disingenuous to worry that employers must be protected from powerful
unions. In addition, historically, most mainstream American unions have had a direct
incentive to preserve firms’ ability to remain competitive and have often mobilized to
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defend the economic interests of the industries in which they are embedded. It is also
important to recognize that we are discussing the enforcement of minimum protections
set substantively at a very low level compared to average wages in the United States.
It may be that in emerging market democracies, the need for jobs is so dire that it overshadows the need for labor enforcement.119 However, in the United States, it is clearly
in the public interest that firms competing on the basis of underpayment of minimum
wages be prevented from doing so, even if this means they go out of business.
A final political argument might be that our model represents a radical departure
from American regulatory tradition. We believe it does not. From the recent increase
in voluntary organizations playing a role in government social service delivery programs, to the DOL’s own tradition of collaboration with employers, the line between
public and private is more fluid than it has sometimes been painted. Indeed, there have
been examples of formal grants of government power to private groups at the federal,
state, and local levels going back to the early 1800s.120 During the 1930s, when New
Deal programs provoked interest in the matter, scholars asked whether such delegation
might in some way violate the Constitution.121 Their greatest concern, however, was
reserved for delegations of power that permitted private groups to participate in the
setting of rates or standards, as opposed to the cases we discuss, where third parties are
enlisted in enforcing standards that have already been set through the legislative process. For example, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA)—established as a nonprofit organization by the New York State legislature
in 1866122—involves the complete delegation of law-enforcement authority to a private group without any standard-setting power. It has survived a number of legal challenges.123 In another example, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 delegated to
elected committees of farmers the power to administer price- and income-support programs, including inspecting stored commodities and making compliance determinations, for which they were paid a modest salary.124

Objection 2:The Public/Private Distinction
Some might object that the model we propose will only work in a prevailing-wage
setting, with its public funding, public bidding processes, strong penalties, and substantial union footholds. And yet we think it has potential in a range of other nonfootloose sectors of the domestic economy as well. As we note in the introduction,
low-wage service-sector jobs tend to be configured in steep hierarchies, with the least
power concentrated in the subcontractors and with larger entities such as retailers,
owners, or brands at the top. This power structure and the repertoire of labor-standards
challenges that accompany it provide opportunities for our model to be broadly
applied, as long as inspectors are able to address the dynamics of specific industries.
The rationale for a high level of scrutiny on public job sites has been twofold: wages
paid by the state should not undercut local wage standards, and projects paid for with state
money should be held to the highest safety standards. It is time to rethink old orthodoxies
of public and private. The fact that deputization has worked so well in the public sector
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ought to encourage its extension to the private sector, especially in industries with very
high levels of noncompliance. Wage-and-hour and health-and-safety laws apply to all
workplaces, not just public ones. Private employers have public obligations, and private
noncompliance has public consequences. Tax money funds the infrastructure private sector employers rely upon; safety problems invariably have fiscal implications, and so, of
course, does the nonpayment of wages, workers’ compensation, or payroll taxes.
A final public/private question relates to funding. If additional resources could be
made available by the state, why not just hire more government investigators?
Although we do believe strongly in expanded inspectorates at both the federal and
state levels, we also believe that directing additional resources to third-party partners,
along with the government staffing necessary to support them, would bring benefits to
the inspection program that could not be realized through government inspectors
alone, because of the parties’ complementary strengths. Furthermore, revenue generated by innovations designed to address the problem of inadequate penalties could be
channeled directly to the organizations that worked with them on the case in question.
This would represent a sort of “bounty” that would give organizations an additional
incentive to seek out the worst violators.125

Objection 3: Only Unions Are Suited for the
Partnership Role (but Unions Are Scarce)
Given that unions have political pull, a strong self-interest in enforcement, and a normative commitment to workplace standards, it is no coincidence that all three of our
cases involve unions and union employers. These cases seem to closely align with the
original conception of how FLSA enforcement would work. But what about industries
and labor markets where union presence is very low? Only one of our cases (W&HW)
also involves workers’ organizations that are independent of unions.
In many low-wage sectors, particularly those with a heavily immigrant workforce,
worker centers seem to be in a good position to partner with the government. In previous work, we have chronicled the rise of worker centers, which have grown from just
five in 1992 to approximately 170 in 2009.126 While worker centers are not substitutes
for unions, one of their most important functions has been calling attention to widespread labor-standards violations and providing legal and organizing support for some
of the worst-off workers to seek redress. In fact, even in labor markets and industries
that are partially unionized, it is often the worker centers that have more activist organizing models and deeper relationships with workers.
We do note that there is a significant difference between worker centers and unions
regarding their relationship to employers. Because worker centers in general do not
negotiate collective-bargaining agreements on behalf of workers, they do not share a set
of interests with a group of employers as unions do once they have organized a meaningful segment of an industry. As a result, they may be less sympathetic to employers’
concerns. There are some recent indications, however, that this is changing: for example,
the Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY) has been instrumental in
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bringing high-road employers together to establish a new restaurant association, and
worker centers organizing with the Laborers’ International Union of North America
(LIUNA) in residential construction and weatherization are also forging relationships
with union signatories in the industry. Additionally, we have often heard concern
expressed among day laborer centers that efforts to improve conditions through the
formalization of hiring not go so far as to eliminate day labor entirely.

. . . And the Perennial Question of How Institutional
Change Takes Place
Ultimately, whether these programs are enacted and whether they are successful will
depend, to a large extent, on politics. Political power is how the Los Angeles Building
and Construction Trades Council was able to create the LAUSD program in 1985 and
expand it to Public Works in 2004, and it is the reason a liberal Democrat was elected
governor of New York and was then able to put in new leadership willing to experiment at the state DOL. In asserting that politics is the bottom line, however, we do not
mean to imply that the challenges stop at the agency door. A new mayor or governor
must bring about change within the bureaucracy. How do prevailing norms and
assumptions shift within government agencies or, for that matter, any organizational
entity? We think careful documentation and dissemination of results through professional associations like the Interstate Labor Standards Association—along with the
establishment of creative programs of internal education and training—are important
to demonstrate that innovative programs are actually effective.
Furthermore, we know that organizational cultures can be major barriers to innovation, and that road blocks to implementation arise based upon failures of communication127 and from competing sets of interests and power differentials within agencies. If
attention is not paid to radically rethinking protocols and shifting incentives on the
inside, change at the top will never be enough.128 As Piore and Schrank as well as
Bardach and Kagan have observed, in reaching an understanding of a state agency, it
is critical to develop a sense of the institutional regulatory practices that are entrenched
in regulatory bodies.129 Our conversations with labor-standards administrators in New
York, New Jersey, and California affirm the centrality of the challenge of organizational culture.

Conclusion
In this article, we have tried to understand the different systems of labor-standards
inspection that have emerged over the past seventy-plus years and to identify promising contemporary strategies for improved compliance. Ultimately, our case studies
brought us back to the logic that architects of FLSA had in mind so many years ago:
the direct participation in enforcement of organizations with the greatest incentive to
police their labor markets. We find that worker centers and unions have access to
information about sectors that are otherwise hard for the government to penetrate,
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knowledge about industry structures, and the capacity to reach workers and document
complicated cases. Our three examples illustrate they have the incentives to want to
be helpful and that, when entrusted with authority, they wield it responsibly.
We understand that some may view these proposals as too large a pill to swallow.
We stand strong on our argument that it was a mistake to abandon tripartism as a part
of the package of approaches available to government agencies, but we do not see
wholesale deputization as required in every case. Partial versions of our proposal
could have a significant impact. In fact, the MCTF-JET collaboration, which involves
extensive collaboration but no formal deputization, is an example of a highly effective
partial approach. The bottom line is that marginal increases in the wage and hour
inspectorate alone will be insufficient to solve the problem. In the absence of creative
strategies nested within clear logics of detection and deterrence at both state and federal levels, rates of compliance with minimum-wage and overtime laws are likely to
remain where they are.
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